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Robert A.  Young
In framing a government which is to
be  administered by men  over men,  the
great difficulty lies in this: You mustfirst
enable  the  government  to  control the
governed and in the next place oblige it
to control itself.
James  Madison
The Federalist, No.  51
The  Carter  Administration's  water  policy
review  team  has  identified  the  following
problem  areas  within  current  federal  water
policy:  1) Planning  and Evaluation  Deficien-
cies,  2)  Lack of Emphasis  on Water Conser-
vation,  3)  Adverse  Environmental  Impacts,
4)  Inequitable  Sharing  of Costs,  and 5)  The
Large  Backlog  of  Authorized  Federal
Projects.  [White  House,  Office  of Press  Sec-
retary.]  Students of federal  water  economics
have  argued  for such  reform  for at least two
decades.  [Eckstein;  McKean;  Hirshleifer,  et.
al.].  For the  last  several  years,  the  focus  of
water  policy analysis  has been  on the formu-
lation and implementation of multiple  objec-
tive  planning  procedures  as  codified  in  the
U.S.  Water  Resources  Council's  Principles
and Standards in  1973.  I  am  among  those
who  are  skeptical  that  the  Principles and
Standards represent  an  unequivocal  im-
provement  in  water  planning,  and  believe
the time is ripe for an economic reassessment
of federal  water  planning.  My  objective  in
this  paper is  to restate  and  hopefully  to  ex-
tend the economic  analysis  in support of the
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current  water  policy  reform  proposals.  Due
to my  own  previous  experience  and limited
space,  the paper focuses  on economic  issues
related  to  federal  irrigation  water  planning,
as  administered  through the  U.S.  Bureau  of
Reclamation.
It  is  appropriate  to  begin  this  policy
analysis  with  a  clarification  of my  perspec-
tive.  David Allee  keynoted  a  recent  confer-
ence  with  a  statement  worth  repeating.  He
asserted that the proper  role for academic re-
source  economists  was  to  represent  those
interests which are not otherwise fully repre-
sented in the  political  system  (which I  inter-
pret  to  include  such  groups  as  the  federal
taxpayer  and non-voting future  generations).
In what follows,  an  explicit national account-
ing  stance  is  adopted,  such  that  costs  and
benefits  will be  evaluated  from  the  point of
view  of  the  entire  nation  ("...  to  whom-
soever  they  may  accrue.  ..")  as  contrasted
with regional,  state or private sector perspec-
tive.  It will also be clear that I assign a domi-
nant role to economic  efficiency  in assessing
water  resource  planning.  The  analysis  also
requires  the  other  conventional  normative
and positive  assumptions  of applied  welfare
economics,  particularly  that  preferences  of
individual members of the political-economic
system  can  be  appropriately  measured  in
willingness  to  pay  or  monetary  terms  [Das-
gupta  and  Pearce].  The  remainder  of  the
paper  is  organized  as follows.  The  next sec-
tion  outlines  a  conceptual  perspective.  The
third  section  analyzes  and  critiques  federal
practice in project appraisal from the theoret-
ical  perspective.  Pricing,  cost-sharing  and
financing  are  then  evaluated  against  the
criterion  of economic  efficiency.  Following
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this,  the  conventional  wisdom  that  there
exists an important and inevitable  association
between  public  irrigation  water  investment
and  regional  economic growth is  considered,
and that  hypothesis  is  examined  against  the
body of empirical  evidence.  The closing  sec-
tion  sums  up  the  argument  by  asking-  Is
there  "government  failure"  in resource  allo-
cation,  and  if so,  why,  and what  should  be
done about it?
Market Failure, Government  Failure and
Transaction Costs
The  development  and  use  of water  re-
sources  are  usually  accompanied  by  one  or
more  of the  specific  cases  of market  failure
(including  externalities,  public  goods,  de-
creasing  marginal  costs  and  uncertainty),
which  imply  a  misallocation  of  resources
under  market  mechanisms.  Economic
analysis  of public  water  resource  manage-
ment  has long emphasized  market  failure  as
justification  for  public  intervention  into  the
allocation  of water  [Krutilla  and  Eckstein].
Externalities  can  be  positive  or  negative,
pecuniary  or  technological  and  derive  from
either development or allocation.  Economies
of large  scale  and decreasing  marginal  costs
are  often  found  in  water  development
schemes, creating problems for financing sys-
tems large enough  to capture  cost economies
and presenting difficulties  in establishing  ef-
ficient  pricing  mechanisms.  Recreational
uses do not usually  consume water at the ex-
pense  of other  users,  so  in  these  cases  the
resource  is  a  public  or  collective  good.  Fi-
nally,  the  flowing,  mobile  nature  of  the  re-
source  and its changing  physical  characteris-
tics as it passes from vapor to liquid to solid in
the  hydrologic  cycle  are  causes  for  high
transaction  costs  in establishing  and  enforc-
ing property  rights  in  water.  In  such  cases,
water may be left  as  a common  property re-
source,  and  opportunity  costs  of  utilization
may not appropriately  confront  the user.
Harold  Demsetz  has  shown  that  most  of
these market failures can be subsumed under
the transactions  cost framework,  in that each
represents  an  instance  in  which  costs  of  in-
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formation,  contracting  and policing are  rela-
tively large  and misallocations  must be large
to justify the establishment of non-market al-
location  institutions.
Hence,  we  have  in  the  U.S.,  a pervasive
system of non-market mechanisms  for alloca-
tion of water,  ranging from public ownership
of urban water utilities,  through state admin-
istrative regulations  covering the exchange of
water  rights  to  national  programs  for  de-
velopment  of water supplies.  Just  as the pri-
vate  enterprise  system  for  allocating  re-
sources is  challenged for market failures,  it is
appropriate  to  inquire  as  to  the  degree  to
which public  management  of water  supplies
succeeds  in  efficiently  allocating  resources.
The thrust of this paper  is an examination  of
the  parallel  hypothesis  of "government  fail-
ure" in  federal irrigation water resource  allo-
cation.
Looking back three-quarters  of a century,
we can agree that federal  actions in irrigation
water  development  stemming from  the Rec-
lamation  Act  of  1902  could  be  economically
efficient,  in  utilizing  potential  scale
economies  and allowing  for  pecuniary exter-
nalities  (which  we  now  call  regional  de-
velopment  or  secondary  economic  impacts).
Neither of the above  could be fully captured
by  private  sector  developers.  The  program
also  sought  to  settle  the  undeveloped  arid
west  and  to  increase  food  production  for  a
growing population.  The question for 1978  is
whether these justifications  still exist.
The government failure hypothesis derives
from  postulates  very  similar  to  those  em-
ployed  in  conventional  welfare  economic
theorizing,  from  which  the  market  failure
model  is  derived.  The  individual  actors-
voters,  legislators,  bureaucrats  and  interest
groups  - are  viewed  as  rational,  self-
interested utility maximizers.  The model has
been  expounded  primarily  by  the  "public
choice"  school,  rooted in  the writings  of An-
thony  Downs,  James  Buchanan  and Gordon
Tullock,  and  Mancur  Olsen  (See  Gwartney
for  a  summary.)  This  approach  has  only  re-
cently established  a toe-hold  among political
scientists  interested  in  policy  analysis.
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Vincent Ostrom presents the only application
to water policy with which  I am  familiar.
Self-interested  agency  employees
(bureaucrats)  are  motivated  to  maximize
budgets,  which  are  correlated  with  salary,
work-place  amenities,  and  similar  perquis-
ites.  Certain  narrowly-based  interest  groups
may  perceive  large  economic  returns  from
public resource  development programs,  and
provide  strong political support to legislators
and  agencies  who  promote  these  programs.
Legislators with an eye toward reelection re-
ward  such  support  with  appropriations.
Where information  is costly, voters find it ra-
tional  to be uninformed  on specific details  of
policy. Therefore,  the political system can fail
to allocate  resources  optimally,  in the  sense
that  programs  are  adopted  which  fail  to
maximize  utility,  because  information  costs
inhibit voters from  developing  the full infor-
mation necessary  to insure that  their prefer-
ences are  fully exercised.
Theory Vs.  Practice in
Project Appraisal
Irrigation project appraisal for the National
Economic  Development  Account  (economic
efficiency)  purports  to  employ  conventional
benefit-cost  analysis.  A  project  is  deemed
economically  feasible  if  the  discounted
stream  of  benefits  exceeds  the  discounted
stream of costs and the public  project is the
least expensive method of providing the out-
put  of goods  and  services  [Herfindahl  and
Kneese].  In  this  section,  I  compare  the
theoretical  ideal  with  agency  practice  for
each  of these elements.
Measuring Benefits
Benefits are defined in terms of willingness
to pay for  project  outputs  [Young  and  Gray
1972].  For an intermediate  good such as irri-
gation water,  market values are rarely availa-
ble for a specific project area, so the accepted
procedure  is  to  define  benefits  in  terms  of
change in net income,  with as compared to
without the project.  [U.S.  Water  Resources
Council;  Stewart;  and  Young  and  Gray,
1972].
The discussion can be facilitated by express-
ing the concept in  symbols:
Let
m  n
1)  Z=  E  YiPy-  Xj  Px
i=l  j=l
where Z  = Net income (for project area);  Y =
Irrigated crop outputs (i=1,2...  m); and X
=  Inputs  to  production  (excluding  irriga-
tion  water)  (j=1,2...  n).  Time  subscripts
are  omitted to  simplify notation.
Then  the  change  in  net  income  (AZ)  can
be written  as  follows,  introducing subscripts
(0,1) to  represent the  yield  and input  quan-
tities  in  the without  (0)  and  with  (1) cases,
respectively.
2)  AZ =  Z1 - Z  =
m  n
(  YliPyi  - X1jPxj)
i=l  j=l
n  n
-(  YoiPyi  - E  XojPxj)
i=l  j=l
(Input and commodity prices are convention-
ally  assumed  to  be  unaffected  by  a  given
project  output.)  Two  objections  to  specific
procedures  employed  by  USBR  are  ex-
pressed  here.  One  has  to  do  with  the  as-
sumed zero  social opportunity costs of family
labor and management,  and the second with
general  equilibrium  effects  of  assumed  im-
provements  in crop  production  technology.
The first  issue, the  social opportunity  cost
of family labor,  was analyzed by Freeman  in
1966.  He  showed  that the  USBR procedure
of omitting  a  charge  for  family  labor  under
the more intensive post-project  farming con-
ditions,  in  effect,  assigned  a  zero  social  op-
portunity cost to such labor. Appropriate cor-
rections  were  found to have  a major  impact
on estimated net benefits.  No change in this
analytic  procedure  has  been  made  in  the
ensuing  dozen  years,  however,  and  project
benefit  estimates are accordingly  overstated.
Freeman's  analysis  did  not  consider  the op-
portunity  cost of management,  a factor  also
ignored  by  USBR  procedures.  Many  farm
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management  analysts attribute a charge of 10
to  15  percent of gross  sales for  coordination
and supervisory  activities,  an amount  which
if taken  into  account,  has  a large  impact  on
AZ  in Equation  2.
The  second  issue  deals  with  the  general
equilibrium  impacts  of projected  crop  yield
increases.  The USBR procedure  posits  a two
percent  annual  increase  in  crop  yields,
projecting trends of the past several  decades.
Crop  yield  estimates  in the benefit  measure
are  derived  as  of the  half-way  point  in  the
project  life.  For  a project  with  an  assumed
ten-year  planning  and  construction  period
and  a 50-year life,  the yield estimate  is  as of
35  years  into  the  future  (10  +  50/2).  This
permits a crop yield projection for benefit es-
timate  purposes  of 70  percent  over  yields
being  experienced  at  the  date  the  calcula-
tions  were made.  However,  inadequate  ad-
justments  are  made  for  added  inputs  to
achieve  yield  increases.  More  significantly,
no  compensating  adjustments  in commodity
prices  are allowed.  This  is,  in effect,  a partial
equilibrium  approach  to  a  general  equilib-
rium  problem.  Technological  improvements
will  affect  all  the  nation's  crop  production,
not  just  that  which  occurs  on  reclamation
projects.  Increases  of such  magnitudes  are
likely  to have  adverse  effects  on  prices.  The
history  of agricultural  prices in the  U.S.  has
shown that the producer captures little if any
of technological  advances.  Given the  inelas-
ticity  of demand  with  respect  to  price,  the
real price of food has fallen  as per acre yields
have increased.
This  is  not  to  claim  the  question  of the
proper price has  an  easy solution.  A number
of analysts have advocated  using current crop
yields and prices  implicitly assuming that the
forces  of population,  income  and  export
growth,  and yield increase will remain  in the
same relationship  as presently exists  [Martin
and Young].  This  is a rather conservative  as-
sumption,  and probably  underestimates  the
negative  effect  of increased  output  on  real
prices.  Keleta  shows  that  the  USBR  proce-
dure  has  an  enormous  impact  on  benefit
measures,  increasing  the  estimated  benefit
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by a factor  of two to four as compared  to the
alternative  assumption  of current yields  and
prices.
It is my belief that if these two points were
properly  accounted  for in  USBR  benefit  es-
timate  procedures,  there  would  have  been
only  a very  few,  if any,  projects  initiated  in
the past  two decades  which  could  have  met
the B-C  criterion.
Measuring Social Costs of
Irrigation  Projects
Estimating  social  costs  in  benefit-cost
analysis  is  generally  thought  to be  the  least
difficult issue, and recent analysts have given
the agencies  passing  marks  in estimating ac-
tual budget  outlays.  However,  budget costs
are  not the same  as  social costs,  and several
examples  may  be  identified  where  agency
practices  tend to ignore the distinction.
The first instance involves the social cost of
farmland for a reservoir.  The USBR tends to
use  current  market  prices  as  a  measure  of
social  cost.  In the  Narrows project proposed
for  the  lower  South  Platte  in  Colorado,  the
reservoir  site will inundate  a valley which al-
ready  contains  a small  but thriving commu-
nity  and  a considerable  amount  of irrigated
land.  The  land  acquisition  in  the  project
planning  reports  is  costed  at  the  purchase
price on the current market.  Bidders  in that
land  market,  because  of risk  and  other  fac-
tors,  probably  have  a  higher  discount  rate
than  does  the  public  (see  below)  and  most
certainly  estimate the stream of benefits less
optimistically than does the government pro-
cedure described  above. As Eckstein pointed
out  two decades  ago,  the proper  procedures
would be to calculate  the social  opportunity
cost of such land in  terms  of foregone  bene-
fits,  and the foregone benefits  should,  in this
case, be estimated in exactly the same way as
are the direct benefits.  Such  an approach,  in
the Narrows  case,  would have increased  land
acquisition  costs by some  300 percent.
Another  example  is  the  foregone  non-
market benefits where the construction site is
on  public  land  and  is  used  for  recreation.
(These are the "Environmental  Costs"  noted
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by the water policy review.) While we are on
much less  firm ground in assigning measures
of environmental  benefits  foregone,  the  ef-
fect of placing estimates  in the social cost col-
umn should be a step in the right direction. It
is  not  clear  that  the  new  Environmental
Quality account procedures are  all that help-
ful  in  resolving  these  issues.  In  fact,  EIS
statements are a step backward in economics,
largely obscuring the  detail of the  economic
analysis.
My final example of unstated social costs is
external diseconomies.  The classic instance  is
the  Welton-Mohawk  project  in  western
Arizona,  where  seepage  from  upslope  lands
caused  waterlogging  and  salinization  on
lower-lying  project  lands.  The  drainage  sys-
tem  installed  to  mitigate  that  externality
passed the salinity back to the Colorado  River
and hence to Mexico,  precipitating the great
Colorado  River  Salinity  controversy  [Oyar-
zabal and Young].  There  is indication that at
least the  first  of  the twin  diseconomies  was
anticipated,  but was  not  costed,  since  the
project would thereby have been  infeasible.
The Social Rate of Discount
The discount rate has an obvious impact on
water  projects,  which  are  characterized  by
large  front-end  costs  and  a  long  life  over
which  net benefits  are  discounted.  A decade
ago,  the Water Resources Council  took steps
to bring the rate of discount on public water
projects  more closely  in line  with social  cost
of capital.  Currently, a rate of 6 5/8 percent is
authorized.  (That rate is, I think, about right,
but for the wrong reasons.  But that's another
story.) The  Congress,  however,  has permit-
ted  a  grandfather  clause  such  that  projects
authorized  earlier  than  1968  may  be
evaluated at  the rate  in  effect  at their initial
evaluation.  While  the  bias  from  using  3.25
percent  rather than  6.625 percent  will vary
from project to project,  the impact is clearly
non-trivial.
Identifying Lesser-Cost Alternatives
The  two  major  conditions  for  economic
feasibility,  it will be recalled, are 1) a positive
discounted  net  benefit  stream  and  2)  an as-
surance that the proposed public investment
is the least expensive means of achieving  the
same  outputs.  For  this  second  condition,
both the private sector and state or local gov-
ernment jurisdictions  can  be the  source  of a
lesser-cost  alternative.
My  observations  of  a  number  of  federal
water  projects  suggest  that attempts to iden-
tify  lesser-cost  alternatives  involving  other
than federal construction are seldom pursued
with any reasonable vigor and are never suc-
cessful.  Of course,  the  least cost  alternative
may mean  no public action at all,  a course  of
action that gets insufficient  attention.
Examples  on this  issue  come mainly  from
situations  where  reliance  on private  ground
water development,  perhaps as a new source
of water or perhaps  a continuation of existing
developments,  provides  a viable  alternative
solution  to  a  public  investment.  Ground
water  management  involves  many  un-
knowns,  such  as  the  exact  nature  of  many
complex  interdependencies  and  the  true
quantity  and/or  quality  of  the  resource.
Hence,  reliance  on  such  sources  may  be
fraught with legal  and  political  complexities
and high risks  of getting into long-lasting ad-
versary  court  actions.  In  economic  terms,
high transaction costs may characterize  these
alternatives.  Thus,  apparently,  simple  engi-
neering solutions are sought by local interests
for  solutions  to problems.  The  federal  plan-
ning  capability,  of course,  largely  concen-
trates  on  design  and  appraisal  of structural
measures.  Federal benefit-cost analysis  is or-
ganized  to determine  if a  specific project  is
feasible,  and  only  recently  have  attempts
been made  to answer the larger  questions of
what  is  the  best  long-term  policy.  I  am,  in
reality,  less  critical of agency practice on this
point  than  on  the  earlier  ones  mentioned.
The economics  profession has only  in  recent
years  begun  to  focus  on rigorous  analysis of
alternative  institutions,  and if there  were  a
sincere effort  to examine such alternatives,  it
is  not  clear how  much  help  we have  yet  to
offer.
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Pricing,  Cost-Sharing  and Finance
The  arrangements  whereby  irrigation
water  is  priced  and financed  have  consider-
able interest to economists, both for their dis-
tributive  and  allocative  impacts.  Economic
efficiency  requires  that price be  set at long-
run  marginal  cost,  while  equity calls  for  be-
neficiaries  to  pay  in  proportion  to  services
received.
Pricing and Beneficiary Cost-Sharing
The provisions surrounding  finance of rec-
lamation  projects  have had a stormy  history.
Numerous  changes  have  been  made  by  the
Congress,  all  in  the  direction  of  further
separating  beneficiaries  from  incurring  the
full cost of the facilities.  In the flush  of early
optimism,  the  Reclamation  Act  of  1902
provided  that  settlers  were  to  receive  land
without  cost  and  repay  the  facilities  cost
without interest  on the money in a period of
ten years  [Huffman].  When it was found that
new  settlers  inexperienced  with  irrigation
might  not be  generating  surplus income  for
several years, the repayment period was soon
extended  to 20 years  and finally  to 40 years,
still  interest  free.  Amendments  to  the  Rec-
lamation  Law  passed  in  1939  in  effect  sepa-
rated repayment  requirements  from  the  ac-
tual cost of delivering the  water.  Charges  to
water users were converted  from a cost basis
to  an  "ability  to pay"  principle,  based  on  a
concept  of "repayment  capacity."  The  re-
payment  obligation  remains  free  of interest
charges.  Current  projects  are  subsidized  to
over 80 percent of costs,  if the interest  on a
normal repayment period is factored in. That
is,  irrigation water recipients are obligated to
pay less than 20 percent of the cost of struc-
tures,  storages  and  conveyance  systems
[North  and Neely].
It is  instructive  to  examine  the  ability  to
pay formula in  detail.  The formula  turns out
to be almost  exactly  identical  to Equation  2,
shown  above  in  connection  with  the  discus-
sion  of  benefit  measurement.  The  same
budget  data  assembled  for  the  project  area
are  employed.  Two  crucial  changes  are
262
made,  however.  First,  crop yields  for the re-
payment  capacity  analysis  are current rather
than  1.7  times  the  current  level,  as  in  the
benefit  measure.  Second,  a  family  living  al-
lowance is deducted.  (The allowance changes
over  time to reflect  the  cost  of living.)  The
final  details  of  the  repayment  contract  for
water  is  a  matter  of negotiation  between
USBR  regional  officials  and  representatives
of the conservancy district or water  users as-
sociation  which  will  eventually  receive  and
distribute the project water.  The federal rep-
resentatives are authorized to set the contract
at  a rate  up  to  25  percent  below the  calcu-
lated repayment capacity,  as an allowance for
risk.  That  discretionary  power  is  usually
exercised,  so  the  effective  cost  to the water
users is typically 75 percent of the estimated
repayment capacity.
Several economically  significant inferences
can  now  be  drawn.  First,  while  the  family
living  allowance  is  not  a precise  measure  of
the social opportunity cost of family labor and
management,  which properly  would  be  de-
ducted  from  revenues  in  the  change  in  net
income  calculations,  it is  not  too  inaccurate
an  estimate,  and certainly  much  better than
the one  used.  Therefore,  if one  accepts  that
current  yields  and  current  prices  represent
an appropriate  basis for computing change  in
net income,  the repayment  capacity  is  a  rea-
sonably  accurate  measure  of  the  value  pro-
ductivity  (benefits) of water.  Second,  the ac-
tual  cost-share  or  price  contracted  for  by
water  user  groups  will be enough  below the
value  productivity  of  water,  that  even  the
most  risk-averse  of farmers  will be  willing to
enter  into  the  repayment  contract.  Third,
note that no matter what the social cost of the
project might be,  such costs  have no bearing
on  the  "cost-sharing"  arrangement  nego-
tiated  between  the  government  and  the
water users.  The water users  always are pre-
sented with terms  they can  afford unless the
repayment  capacity  is  greatly  overstated.
Given that the beneficiaries pay but a fraction
of  costs,  even  if  benefits  are  greatly  over-
stated, the ratio of local benefits to local costs
is  quite  likely  to  be  greater  than  1.0.  Local
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demand for  projects  is  not  surprising  under
the  circumstances.  Finally,  very little  of the
subsidy  (the  difference  between  actual  cost
and the  charges  levied  on  the  user) actually
accrues to  the farmers themselves.  In reality
the  majority  of the  investment  is dissipated
to the bureaucratic planning process  and the
construction industry.  A large public expense
is made per dollar of net water user benefits.
Financing
By the late  1930s,  it became clear that be-
neficiary  groups  would  be  unable  to  repay
the  full  amount  of irrigation  project  invest-
ments,  even  within  the  long  interest-free
period.  Congress,  undaunted  by that quasi-
market test of program viability,  adopted the
"ability  to  pay principle" just described,  and
authorized  the difference to be paid from hy-
droelectric power revenues.  Electricity  sales
turned out  to be the real jackpot  of the rec-
lamation program,  even more so with the re-
cent energy  shortages.
The  interpretation,  promulgated  by  the
USBR,  that  water  users  repay  project  costs
may  be technically  true,  in  that users,  as  a
whole,  are  obligated  to  repay  those  costs
Congress has specified to be "reimbursable."
That portion of irrigation  projects  not repaid
by farmers are financed by "Basin Accounts,"
which  permit deficits  from  one project to  be
made  up  from  surpluses  from  others.  This
preserves  the illusion that beneficiaries repay
costs  and  that  the  federal  Treasury,  in  the
long  run,  comes  out  even.  However,  the
power beneficiary  pays most (80  +  %) of the
irrigation  water costs.
Therefore,  the  assertion  that  users  do
pay warrants the most serious  challenge.  The
overall  financing  system  can be viewed  as  a
vesting  of property rights  for  the remaining
undeveloped waters  in the west (and for  the
associated  electricity)  in the  Bureau  of Rec-
lamation (directly)  and indirectly in the small
group of potential water users who may even-
tually  benefit  by  having their  water  supply
financed  by  surplus  power  revenues.  No
provision  has yet been made for power reve-
nues  to  go  to  other  than  water  projects.
Therefore,  the only regional use  is for  more
water projects  and  the power revenues  fund
is,  in  effect,  a common property resource  to
be captured by the  state or locality with the
most  effective  and  powerful  Congressional
support.  On  the  principle  that  the  net  in-
vestment  return  ought  to  go  to  the  risk-
bearer,  which  is  the  public  via  the  federal
Treasury rather  than the  USBR  or  potential
beneficiaries,  the  surplus  power  revenues
should  be returned  to the  general  treasury,
or  at least made  available  to the states with-
out  requiring that  such  monies  be  spent for
water  projects.  In  view  of the  prospective
enormous  sums  becoming  available  due  to
energy  price increases,  this matter  deserves
immediate resolution.
We  turn  now  to the  question  of regional
economic  development  and  the evidence  on
the role of public  water investment.
Irrigation Development  and Regional
Economic  Growth:  Myth and Reality
The  early  supporters  of federal  participa-
tion in reclamation listed prominently among
their  objectives  "to  develop  and  utilize  re-
sources  then  unused."  [Hibbard,  pp.  439-
42].  This has  carried  through to the present
day. In Principles  and Standards [U.S. Water
Resources  Council]  regional  development  as
an objective occupies  a prominent role in the
evaluation  procedures.
Through its  effects - both beneficial
and  adverse  - on  a  region's  employ-
ment,  population,  economic  base,
environment,  social  development,  and
other factors,  a plan  may  exert  a  signifi-
cant influence  on the course  and direc-
tion  of  regional  development  (pp.
24816).
Benefit-cost  analysts  are  advised  by
theorists  to  omit  secondary  impacts  from
studies  taking  a  national  accounting  stance
[McKean],  since the impacts  are expected  to
be offset elsewhere except  in special circum-
stances.  However,  reading  their pronounce-
ments  on  western  water  policy,  one  would
infer that there is little doubt in the minds of
most influential western political leaders  and
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members of the press that there is a large and
inevitable  linkage  between  irrigation  water
development  and  regional  growth.  It is  this
mythology  which  provides  the  justification
for  the intense political pressures  in support
of irrigation  development.  This  section  sur-
veys the  evidence for such  a belief.
The  a  priori analysis  of the  issues  would
question  this  optimism.  New  water  goes
largely to marginal crops: feed grains and for-
ages.  For  such  crops,  employment  and  net
income  per acre  foot  of water  are  relatively
low.  Further,  the  multipliers  which  repre-
sent  the  impact  of producing  such  crops  on
the  related  sectors  tend  also  to  be  low,  so
regional  impacts  are  not  likely  to be  large.
[Kelso,  et.  al.].  If  factor  supplies  are  at  all
elastic,  which,  in the long run, we would ex-
pect  to  be  the  case,  large  economic  rents
would accrue  only during the initial stages of
a  project.  The  exception  would  be  land,
which tends  to be inelastic  in supply.
I have been  able  to identify  only  a few ex
post statistical analyses of the impacts of pub-
lic  water  investment  on  regional  economic
growth.  Howe and Cox,  et.  al.,  from statisti-
cal  studies  concentrating  on  the  east  and
south,  agreed  in  inferring  that  "water  re-
source  developments  are  likely  to  be  poor
tools  for  accelerating  regional  economic
growth."  (See Fullerton,  et.  al.,  p.  2,  for  a
methodological  critique of their techniques.)
Rivkin-Carson,  Inc.,  Washington,  D.C.-
based  economic  consultants,  performed  two
analyses  of the  issue  of water  and  regional
growth.  The first  [Carson,  et. al.] attempted
to extend  the previous  research  by sampling
geographic  sub-regions  from  all  parts  of the
country,  both  rural  and  urbanized,  and  at-
tempted  to analyze  the  effect  of a more  ex-
tensive  range  of water  programs  than  just
water  transportation  and  dam  construction.
The  authors  did not  find  statistically  signifi-
cant  relationships  between  water  resource
instruments  and  population  growth  in  the
sample of counties  tested.
The  second  Rivkin-Carson  analysis  (1973),
performed under contract with the Bureau of
Reclamation  ,  was  innovative  in  several  re-
spects. The theoretical and econometric tools
were  more  sophisticated  and  data  were  or-
ganized  in  a unique  fashion.  The  basic  data
unit  was  an  "economic  sub-region"  as  con-
trasted with the more usual political subdivi-
sions.  Economic sub-regions  were defined by
new  techniques  of computer  mapping.  The
main  analysis  of interest  here  is  found  in
Chapter  5  of  the  report,  a  more  accessible
but briefer  version of which  is found in  Cic-
chetti,  et.  al.  A  number  of variables  repre-
senting  Bureau  of  Reclamation  investment
and various  measures  of state and  local  gov-
ernment expenditures were regressed on var-
ious  indices  of growth.  Data were  for  1950,
1960  and  1970 from five  arid western  states
with  operating  USBR projects.
Two  analyses  were  performed:  a  Cobb-
Douglas  production  model  and  a  linear
growth  equation  model.  Deflated  sub-
regional  income  and deflated  value  of farm
output were the proxy measures of output. In
the production model, variables representing
Bureau  investment  in  irrigation  facilities
were not found to have any significant impact
on regional  income and only  a small and not
convincingly  significant  impact  (t-value  =
1.62)  on  value  of  farm  output.  The  growth
equations showed sub-regional incomes to be
positively related to some USBR investments
as  well  as  to  state  and local  government  ex-
penditures  on education,  health,  and  so on.
However,  irrigation investment  did not enter
as a significant variable  in  any of the growth
equations.  Coefficients  for  those  Bureau  in-
vestments  which  were  significant,  hy-
dropower, flood control and recreation,  were
often  unstable  between  periods  of  analysis
and in the case of hydropower,  with negative
sign.  Goodness  of fit (R 2) and statistical relia-
bility of coefficients as indicated by t statistics
were  for the most part relatively  good.
In  a  study  which  strikingly  parallels
Rivkin-Carson  in  timing,  geographic  scope
and method,  but apparently  without  knowl-
edge of that work (and vice versa),  Fullerton,
et.  al.  used econometric  techniques  to  esti-
mate the quantitative relations between vari-
ous types  of federal water resource  develop-
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ment and economic growth in western water
project  areas  and  surrounding  regions.  The
empirical  analysis  employed  a  variety  of
techniques,  ranging  from  simple  statistical
comparison of means, correlation coefficients
and  multivariate  analysis.  Data  were  ob-
tained for 246 counties and 42 water resource
sub-areas  in  Utah,  Colorado,  New  Mexico,
Nevada,  Montana,  Wyoming  and Idaho.  Up
to 12 indicators of regional  economic growth,
including  population  and  three  measures  of
income  were  compared  for  areas  with  and
without  water  investments.  The  analysis  is
performed  with  obvious  care  and rigor,  but
the results  generally  identify  no relationship
between  water  investment  and  economic
growth. In many of the regression  equations,
in  fact,  the  irrigation  investment  variable  is
negative  in  sign and in  no case  is  an  invest-
ment  variable  found  to  be  significant.  The
authors  sum up:
The null hypothesis that regional eco-
nomic growth is caused by investment in
water resources  of various  types is  given
virtually no  support from  these  empiri-
cal results (p.  22).
In  anticipation  that  more  refined  and de-
tailed  data would  provide  more  reliable  re-
sults,  the  authors  turned  to  a  detailed
analyses  of the  New  Mexico  experience  for
which  the  best  data  on  water  investments
were  available.  A  simultaneous  equation
model was  specified.  These results  also indi-
cated  that  the  null hypothesis  could  not  be
rejected  at the  10 percent  level,  and coeffi-
cient  signs  (often  negative),  if  significant,
would  imply that  "water investment may be
counterproductive  in  terms  of  income  and
employment,"  (p.  31).
Shanks  studied  development  impacts  of
five  large  projects  in  the  Upper  Missouri.
While  he  reported  a  short term  growth  im-
pact  during the  construction  period,  in  the
long  run,  few differences  between impacted
counties  and  a set of control  counties  could
be  measured.  Whittlesey,  et.  al.  have  also
found  significant  social  costs  for  regional  in-
frastructure  and  social  services  imposed  by
an irrigation project  in Washington  State.
Conclusion
Summary
1.  Federal  irrigation  project  evaluation
procedures  tend  to  systematically  overstate
benefits  and systematically  understate  costs.
Potential lesser-cost  alternatives  to  construc-
tion programs  are  not vigorously  sought out
and examined.  The biases  are not minor,  and
taken  together,  suggest  that  few  if any
projects  initiated  in  the  past  few  decades
would have been justified with proper evalu-
ation procedures.
2.  Cost-sharing  and  financing  procedures
violate both  economic  efficiency  and  equity
criteria.  Repayment  charges  are  far  below
long-run  marginal  cost.  Irrigation  water  re-
cipients  are  obligated  to  repay  only  the  re-
payment  capacity,  which  as  calculated,  has
no  relation  to  project  costs  and  is  free  of
interest charges.
3.  Funds to repay the balance  of costs are
obtained from hydroelectric  power revenues.
These  basin  funds  are,  in  effect,  a common
pool  of water development  funds  which  has
zero opportunity cost for states with potential
project  sites.
4.  Since  new  irrigation  projects  will
provide,  at the  margin,  new  output of low-
valued feed  grain  or  forage  crops,  little  re-
gional  growth  impact  would  be  expected.
This  prediction  is  not  contradicted  by  the
available  statistical evidence.
My  conclusion  is  that  the  project  evalua-
tion procedures,  the methods  of cost-sharing
and  the  financing  mechanisms  all  point  to
major  misallocation  of federal  tax  monies  as
characteristic  of the  federal  irrigation  pro-
gram.  The hypothesis  of government  failure
in  efficient  resource  allocation  is  strongly
supported.  Further,  there  is  little  evidence
of important  alternative  social  values  being
gained  (for  example,  in  the  Social  Well-
Being,  Regional  Development  or
Environmental  Accounts)  to offset the losses
in  allocative  efficiency.
Finally,  it appears that the federal program
is,  in many respects,  a hindrance  rather than
a help in solving local or regional water prob-
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lems. The Reclamation program concentrates
on  construction  projects  as  a  solution,  and
tends  to  ignore  potential  institutional
changes  which  would  be  more  economical.
There  is an  enormous  backlog  of authorized
projects,  most of which  could not reasonably
expect funding for a number  of years.  How-
ever,  the  lure  of a federal  solution with  80
percent  federal  funding  improperly
encourages local  areas to be strung along year
after  year  with  small  dollops  of  "planning
funds."  The  inevitable  confrontations  with
the  hard  problems  of water  reallocation  are
postponed,  often with a great waste  of water
and other resources.
Some  Suggestions  for Policy  Change
1.  I  believe  the  key  link  in  the  system
just  described  is  the  common  pool  of
surplus power  revenues  that is permitted by
current law and practice to be tapped only for
additional water projects.  These funds should
be  separated  from  the  Bureau  of Recla-
mation's  financing,  preferably  by  returning
them to the federal Treasury.  An alternative,
more politically feasible approach might be to
return these  surpluses  to the states  in which
they originate with  no strings  attached  as  to
the purpose  for which  they are  used.  Either
of these  approaches  would  establish  a range
of alternative  uses  to  the  present  common
pool of power  revenues  and  by  creating  an
opportunity cost for  irrigation  expenditures,
substantially  reduce  the  incentive  of  the
states  to seek federal water project funds.
2.  Concurrent  with the above,  the "ability
to pay" principle for determining beneficiary
shares  of project costs should be replaced by
a procedure  which  obligates  the  state  or
states which expect to benefit for the long run
marginal cost (full cost)  of project facilities.
3.  The  Water  Policy  Review  Task  Force
has suggested  the creation  of an independent
review  board  to  establish  more  appropriate
criteria  for  project  appraisal  and  to pass  on
individual  project  evaluation  reports.
Clearly, this would provide a most useful cor-
rective to the  existing practices.
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